George F. Kennan: "The Sources of Soviet Conduct"
I.
The political character of the Soviet regime we see today is a product of ideology and environment: the ideology inherited by the current leaders of the Soviet Union from the movement that produced their political background and the environment in which they have held power in Russia for nearly thirty years. Few psychological analyses are as difficult as clarifying the interaction of these two factors and the role each plays in determining Soviet behavior. Nevertheless, such an effort must be made to understand and effectively deal with Soviet actions.
It is difficult to summarize the entire set of ideological concepts that the Soviet leaders brought with them when they seized power. Marx's theories have undergone subtle changes in the Russian version of communism. The materials that serve as the theoretical foundation are broad and complex. However, by 1916, the main content of Russian communist thought can be summarized as follows: (a) The central factor in human life is the system of production and exchange of material products, which determines the nature of social life and the "social appearance"; (b) The capitalist mode of production is evil, inevitably leading to the exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class, failing to fully develop the social economy and fairly distribute the material products created by laborers; (c) Capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction, as the capitalist class cannot adapt to changes in economic development, inevitably provoking revolution and transferring power to the working class; (d) Imperialism, as the final stage of capitalism, must lead to war and revolution.
Other content can be summarized in Lenin's own words: "The unevenness of economic and political development is the absolute law of capitalism. From this, it should be concluded that socialism may first triumph in a few or even a single capitalist country. The proletariat that has triumphed in that country, having deprived the capitalists and organized socialist production in its own country, will rise against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting the oppressed classes of other countries to its side..." It should be noted that they believed that without a proletarian revolution, capitalism would not perish on its own. To overthrow the crumbling system, there must be a final impetus from the proletarian revolutionary movement. This impetus is believed to be inevitable in the long run.
During the fifty years leading up to the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, those involved in the revolutionary movement fervently adhered to this set of ideas. Frustrated, dissatisfied, and with little hope for self-expression (or eager for self-expression), and faced with the tight control of the Tsarist regime, they chose bloody revolution as a means to improve social conditions. This behavior lacked broad support, and these revolutionaries found a very convenient theoretical basis for their instinctive desires in Marxist theory. Marxist theory provided them with a theoretical justification for their restless emotions, total denial of the values under the Tsarist regime, desire for power, and the tendency to seek shortcuts to realize these desires, all of which were scientifically unfounded. Therefore, it is not surprising that they firmly believed that Marxist-Leninist doctrine was absolutely true, rational, and effective, as this doctrine resonated with their impulsive and passionate psychology. There is no doubt about their sincerity. This phenomenon is as old as human nature itself. Edward Gibbon succinctly stated in "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire": "The step from faith to deception is very dangerous and often unconscious; the wise Socrates tells us that the clever may deceive themselves, and the good may deceive others, and the human conscience is in a mixed state between self-delusion and intentional deception." With this entire set of ideas, the Bolshevik Party seized power.
It should be noted that throughout the period of preparing for the revolution, these individuals, like Marx himself, focused more on defeating their competitors than on the form socialism would take in the future; to them, the former preceded the latter. Once in power, their views on the program that should be implemented were largely vague, utopian, and unrealistic. Apart from the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large private capital, there was no unified program. Their approach to the peasants (which, according to Marxist formulas, differed from that towards the proletariat) was an ambiguous issue in Russian communist thought, and it remained a contentious and indecisive issue during the first ten years of Communist rule.
The environment in the initial period after the revolution—civil war, foreign intervention, and the fact that the communists represented only a tiny fraction of the Russian people—necessitated the establishment of a dictatorial regime. "War communism" and the hasty elimination of private production and commerce led to adverse economic consequences and provoked more hostility towards the nascent regime. The temporary slowing of the process of communization in Russia was marked by the New Economic Policy, which alleviated certain economic difficulties and achieved some objectives. However, it also indicated that "capitalist elements in society" always managed to benefit from the government's relaxation of policies, and if allowed to continue existing, they would always pose a significant threat and competition to the Soviet regime. The situation of individual farmers was similar; despite their limited power, they were also private producers.
If Lenin were alive, for the ultimate benefit of Russian society, he might have reconciled these conflicting forces with the stature of a great man, though we cannot be certain he would actually do so. Even if Lenin would do this, Stalin and his followers in the struggle for Lenin's legacy would not tolerate the existence of competing political forces under their coveted regime. Their insecurity was too intense. Their unique extreme fervor and vigilance were incompatible with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of compromise, making long-term decentralization impossible. From the Russian-Asian world that birthed them, they formed a deep skepticism about the possibility of peacefully coexisting with competing forces. Due to their blind faith in the correctness of their doctrine, they always insisted that competing forces either submit to them or be eliminated. The Russian society outside the Communist Party itself was not rigid. Any form of collective action and organization was manipulated by the Party. In Russia, no other vibrant and charismatic organizations were allowed to exist. Only the Party had a strict organizational structure. Outside the Party, there was only disorganized and aimless chaos.
The situation within the Soviet Party was similar. Although party members might participate in elections and engage in formulating, discussing, and implementing policies, their participation was not based on their own will but rather on the need to align with the directives of the higher Party leadership and interpret the meaning of the "instructions."
It should be emphasized again that these individuals engaged in despotism perhaps not out of personal motives. They undoubtedly believed—and easily so—that they knew what was beneficial for society, and once power was secured and unchangeable, they would strive to promote the welfare of society. To achieve the goal of consolidating power, they disregarded divine commandments and human morality, using any means necessary. Only when they felt secure would they begin to consider how to make the people who trusted them live happily and comfortably.
The most prominent environment of the Soviet regime is that, to this day, the process of political consolidation has not been completed; the people in the Kremlin are still deeply entrenched in the struggle to consolidate and strengthen the power they gained in 1917. Their primary purpose in doing so is to deal with internal opposition forces, but there is also an intention to confront the external world. Because ideology teaches them that the external world is hostile to the Soviet Union, ultimately overthrowing the political forces abroad is their historical mission. Russian history and tradition support this understanding. Ultimately, their provocative and uncompromising actions have drawn reactions from the external world. Thus, they are, to use another phrase from Gibbon, forced to deal with the hostile actions they have provoked. By portraying the external world as their enemy, they justify their own correctness; this is an undeniable privilege that everyone possesses; for if one frequently and repeatedly believes this and bases their actions on it, they must be correct.
Due to the characteristics of their spiritual world and ideology, Soviet leaders never acknowledge that the hostility towards them contains reasonable and just elements. This hostility, theoretically, can only come from reactionary, stubborn, and dying capitalism. As long as the official acknowledgment of the remnants of capitalism in Russia exists, it can be used as a reason to maintain the dictatorial regime. However, when these remnants begin to gradually disappear, the legitimacy of the dictatorial regime becomes increasingly untenable, and when the official declaration states that these remnants have been finally eliminated, the rationale for their existence is completely lost. This prompts the Soviet ruling group to adopt new methods, as capitalism no longer exists in Russia, while the existence of serious and widespread alien forces spontaneously arising under their rule is not permitted. Thus, it becomes necessary to emphasize the threat of foreign capitalism to provide a legitimate basis for continuing to maintain the dictatorial system.
This practice began early on. In 1924, Stalin specifically pointed out that maintaining the "repressive apparatus" (mainly referring to the military and secret police) was necessary because "as long as there is a capitalist encirclement, there is a danger of intervention and all the consequences that arise from it." According to this theory, from that time on, all opposition forces within Russia were described as agents of foreign reactionary forces hostile to the Soviet regime.
Similarly, they strongly emphasized the fundamental antagonism between the socialist and capitalist worlds, a communist viewpoint. Many facts prove that this is unfounded. On the one hand, there indeed exists a hostile psychology towards the Soviet Union caused by Soviet philosophy and actions abroad; on the other hand, at certain points in history, military powers, particularly Nazi Germany and Japan in the 1930s, did have plans to invade the Soviet Union, obscuring the real situation. But in fact, Moscow's emphasis on facing external threats to Soviet society is not due to the reality of hostility from abroad, but rather to create excuses for maintaining domestic dictatorial rule.
Therefore, maintaining the current Soviet regime, establishing supreme authority domestically, and fabricating myths of foreign hostility all determine the characteristics of the Soviet regime machine we see today. Domestic institutions that fail to adapt to these purposes are gradually reduced and abolished, while those that do are continuously expanded. The security of the Soviet regime is built on the Party's iron discipline, the omnipresence and severe brutality of the secret police, and a solid state economic monopoly. The Soviet leaders have managed to deal with competing forces to seek security, and the "repressive apparatus" has largely become the overlord of the people (whom they are supposed to serve). Today, the main task of the Soviet regime's key institutions is to perfect the dictatorial system and maintain the notion among the populace that Russia is under siege, with enemies at the gates. The millions of bureaucrats comprising the power structure must do everything possible to maintain this notion among the people; otherwise, they themselves become redundant.
At present, it seems that the Russian rulers will not abolish the repressive apparatus. The process of establishing a dictatorial regime has been ongoing for nearly thirty years, which is unprecedented in contemporary times (at least in terms of its scope). It has not only provoked hostility from abroad but has also led to domestic resistance. The strengthening of the police apparatus has resulted in the potential forces opposing the regime becoming increasingly powerful and dangerous.
The Russian rulers will never abandon the myth they rely on to maintain their dictatorial regime. This myth has become an inseparable part of Soviet philosophy, deeply embedded in the Soviet ideological system through bonds stronger than mere ideological power.
II.
Having discussed so much historical background, how does it reflect on the political character of the Soviet regime we see today?
The traditional ideological theory has not been abandoned. They still firmly believe that capitalism is evil and must inevitably perish, and that the historical mission of the proletariat is to bring about the demise of capitalism and seize power for themselves. However, they emphasize more concepts related to the Soviet regime itself, namely the status of being the only and true socialist regime in a dark and misguided world and the power relations within it.
Among these concepts, they first emphasize the inherent antagonism between capitalism and socialism. We have seen that this notion is so deeply embedded in the foundation of the Soviet regime. It has a profound impact on the behavior of the Soviet Union as a member of the international community. This means that the Soviet Union can never truly believe that it shares common goals with capitalist powers. Moscow always believes that the aim of the capitalist world is to be hostile to the Soviet Union, and thus contrary to the interests of the Soviet people it controls. If at some point the Soviet Union were to sign an agreement that contradicts this notion, it would merely be a tactical maneuver against its adversaries, with the Soviet approach being "buyer beware." The Soviets claim that this antagonism still exists. This is fictional. This gives rise to many perplexing phenomena in Kremlin foreign policy: evasiveness, secrecy, deception, suspicion, and ill intent. In the foreseeable future, these phenomena will not disappear. Of course, their degree and emphasis may vary. When the Soviets have demands of us, this or that behavior may be tempered; at such times, some Americans may be overjoyed, believing that "the Russians have changed," and some even take credit for supposedly bringing about this "change." We must not be deceived by tactical maneuvers. These characteristics of Soviet policy and the ideas that lead to them are closely related to the nature of the internal regime; as long as the nature of the Soviet regime does not change, we will inevitably face this behavior, whether explicit or implicit.
This means that for a long time to come, it will be difficult to deal with the Soviet Union. However, this does not mean that the Soviet Union is engaged in a life-and-death struggle to overthrow our social system within a specific timeframe. Fortunately, the Soviet theory that capitalism will inevitably perish contains the implication that they are not in a hurry to achieve this goal. Progressive forces can prepare for the final showdown over the long term. During this period, it is crucial for domestic and foreign communists to love and defend the "socialist motherland"—the victorious Soviet Socialist Union, as the center of socialist power, promoting its prosperity and troubling and eliminating its enemies. Promoting immature and "adventurous" revolutionary plans abroad would put Moscow in a difficult position and thus be regarded as "unforgivable" or even "counter-revolutionary" actions. The socialist cause defined by Moscow is to support and develop the power of the Soviet Union.
Let us look at the second concept of the Soviet Union, namely that the Kremlin is always correct. In the ideological framework of Soviet power, the existence of independent organizations other than the Party is not permitted, so theoretically, the leadership of the Party must be regarded as the sole source of truth. If there is truth elsewhere, then other organizations should be allowed to exist and freely express their will, which the Kremlin cannot and will not allow.
Therefore, the Party's leadership is always correct, even since Stalin formally established his personal power by announcing the principle of unanimity in the Politburo in 1929.
Since the Party is always correct, there exists the Party's iron discipline. In fact, the two are mutually reinforcing. Establishing strict discipline requires acknowledging the Party's consistent correctness, and the Party's consistent correctness demands adherence to discipline. Together, they determine the behavior of the entire Soviet regime machine. If the third factor is not considered, it is insufficient to understand the role of these two, namely that the Party can propose any theory at any time for tactical reasons, if it is deemed beneficial to its cause, and requires all Party members to faithfully and unconditionally accept this theory. This means that truth is not eternal; it can actually be created by Soviet leaders according to their needs and purposes. Truth can vary weekly or monthly; it is not absolute or immutable—nor is it derived from objective reality. It is merely a manifestation of the wisdom of certain individuals at that time, as they represent the laws of history. These factors result in the goals of the Soviet regime machine being rigid and stubborn. These goals can be arbitrarily changed by the Kremlin, while other countries cannot do so. Once a Party line is established on a specific issue, the entire Soviet government apparatus, including the diplomatic agencies, moves forward like a wound-up toy car along a predetermined path, stopping only when it encounters irresistible forces. The individuals comprising this regime machine are not swayed by external arguments and reasons. Their entire education teaches them to distrust and be suspicious of the outside world. Like a white dog in front of a phonograph, they only listen to the "master's voice." Only the master can change their goals. Therefore, foreign diplomats cannot expect their words to influence Soviet leaders. At most, they can hope that their words will be conveyed to the highest leadership of the Soviet Union, as only they can change the Party's line. However, these individuals are unlikely to be swayed by the typical logic of bourgeois representatives. Due to differing goals, their ways of thinking cannot be consistent. Therefore, facts are more persuasive to the Kremlin than words; only words backed by irrefutable facts will be heard by the Russians.
However, we already know that ideology does not require them to rush to achieve their goals. Like the Church, they only manage ideological concepts (which have long-term significance) and can patiently wait for the realization of their goals. They would never risk losing what they have gained for an illusory future. Lenin himself taught that the pursuit of communist goals should be cautious and flexible. This admonition is made even more important by the lessons of Russian history: having fought for centuries against nomadic peoples on vast, defenseless plains, caution, thorough consideration, flexibility, and deceit are very useful qualities; these qualities are esteemed by both Russians and Eastern peoples. Therefore, Russians do not feel ashamed to retreat in the face of stronger adversaries. Without a specific timeframe for achieving their goals, they are not anxious about making necessary retreats. Russian political behavior resembles a constantly flowing stream, moving towards a predetermined goal. It primarily concerns itself with filling every corner and crevice of the basin of world power that can be reached. If it encounters insurmountable obstacles along the way, it will accept and adapt to this reality with equanimity. The important thing is to always move towards a final goal. In Soviet philosophy, there is no notion that goals must be achieved within a specific timeframe.
Thus, dealing with Soviet diplomacy is both easier and more difficult than dealing with highly aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand, they are more sensitive to the strength of their adversaries; when they feel that the opposing force is too strong, they are more willing to make concessions diplomatically, thus being more rational in terms of power logic and language. On the other hand, a single victory by the adversary does not defeat them or make them lose confidence. Due to their steadfastness, dealing with Russia cannot rely on occasional actions that reflect the demands of public opinion in the democratic world at a certain time; rather, it requires the implementation of wise and far-sighted policies—policies that are no less determined in their goals and flexible in their execution than Soviet policies.
In this context, it is clear that the most important aspect of American policy towards the Soviet Union is the long-term, patient, yet firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansion tendencies. It should be noted that this policy is incompatible with posturing; it does not equate to threats, intimidation, or adopting a "hardline" stance. Although the Kremlin's reactions to political realities are fundamentally flexible, this does not mean that it will disregard its own reputation. Like almost all other governments, the Soviet regime will not retreat in the face of clumsy intimidation. Russian leaders understand human psychology well; they know that losing one's temper and losing control is not a source of strength in political activity. They will strive to exploit this weakness in their adversaries. Therefore, to effectively deal with Russia, foreign governments must absolutely maintain calm and composure at all times, making demands of Russia in a manner that does not easily damage their prestige.
III.
Based on the analysis above, it is clear that the pressure the Soviet Union exerts on the free institutions of the Western world can be contained by flexibly and vigilantly using resistance forces at a series of changing geographical and political points, in accordance with changes in Russian policies and tactics, rather than magically or persuasively making it disappear. The Russians expect to endure forever and see that they have achieved great accomplishments. It should be remembered that there was a time when the Communist Party was less representative domestically than the Soviet Union is in the world today.
If ideology leads Russian rulers to believe that truth is on their side, they can patiently wait for ultimate victory; then we, unbound by this ideology, can freely and objectively judge whether this argument holds water. The Soviet theory implies that it not only completely disallows Western control over its economic lifeline but also envisions that Russia can maintain unity, discipline, and resilience for a long time. What would it mean for this assumption to become a reality if the West were to contain the Soviet regime for 10 to 15 years with sufficient resources and strength?
Soviet leaders utilize the conveniences that modern technology brings to despotism, ensuring that the people under their regime are compliant. Few challenge their authority, and those who do often succumb before the state's repressive apparatus.
The Kremlin has also proven itself capable of disregarding the interests of its residents, establishing a foundation of heavy industry in Russia, although this process is not yet complete, it continues to develop and is increasingly approaching the level of major industrial nations. All of this, whether for maintaining domestic political security or establishing heavy industry, comes at the cost of the people's lives being oppressed, their expectations unfulfilled, and their energies drained. It requires the use of forced labor, the scale and extent of which are unprecedented in modern society during peacetime. It leads to neglect and harm to other aspects of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumer goods production, housing construction, and transportation.
Furthermore, war has resulted in massive property losses, heavy casualties, and exhausted populations. All of this has left today's Soviets physically and mentally fatigued. The masses feel disappointed and no longer easily deceived; if the Soviet regime still has some allure abroad, it is no longer as charming domestically as it once was. The opportunity given to religion to survive during wartime for strategic reasons has been seized with great enthusiasm by the people. This fact eloquently demonstrates that the people do not exhibit much faith or dedication to the regime's goals.
In this context, the physical and mental strength of the people is limited. If this limit is exceeded, even the most brutal dictatorial government cannot drive them. Forced labor camps and other coercive institutions compel people to work under temporary conditions, with working hours exceeding what laborers are willing to endure or what simple economic pressure allows; even if they manage to escape, they will have aged and become victims of despotism. In any of the above scenarios, their primary strength has not been utilized for the benefit of society and the service of the state.
Hope lies only in the younger generation. Despite enduring hardships, the younger generation is numerous and vibrant; moreover, the Russian nation is a talented one. However, it remains to be seen what impact the mental pressures imposed by the Soviet dictatorial regime during childhood, which have increased with the war, will have on their behavior as adults. Except in the most remote farms and villages, concepts such as home security and peace no longer exist in the Soviet Union. It remains unclear whether this will affect the overall capabilities of the new generation that is maturing.
Additionally, while the Soviet economy has achieved some remarkable developments, its growth is unbalanced and flawed. The Russian communists who say "capitalism develops unevenly" should feel embarrassed when they think of their own national economic situation. Certain sectors of the Soviet economy, such as metallurgy and machinery manufacturing, occupy a disproportionately large share compared to others. When there is only a primitive railway network that cannot even be called a road network, they still aspire to become one of the world's industrial powers in a short time. Although they have made considerable efforts to improve labor productivity and teach some very primitive farmers basic machine operation knowledge, the entire Soviet economy is severely mismanaged, with urgent construction investments of poor quality and high depreciation costs. In many sectors of the economy, they have yet to apply the production concepts and technical pride that skilled Western workers possess.
It is hard to believe that these shortcomings can be overcome in the short term by a fatigued and demoralized populace living under fear and pressure. As long as these shortcomings remain unaddressed, Russia will continue to be an economically fragile and, in some sense, weak country, capable of exporting its enthusiasm and emitting that strange political charm, but unable to sustain exports based on real material strength and prosperous products.
At the same time, Soviet political life is also extremely unstable. This instability arises from the transfer of power from one person or group to another.
This primarily concerns Stalin's personal status. We should know that Stalin's rise to become the leader of the communist movement, replacing Lenin, was merely the first transfer of personal authority in the Soviet Union. This transfer took 12 years to consolidate. It caused the deaths of millions and fundamentally impacted the country. Its effects reached the entire international revolutionary movement, severely detrimental to the Kremlin itself.
It is possible that the next transfer of supreme power will be quiet and unobtrusive, not provoking reactions in other regions. However, in Lenin's words, this could likely lead to a rapid shift from "cunning deception" to "brutal violence," a characteristic of Russian history that would fundamentally shake the foundations of the Soviet regime.
But this is not merely a problem of Stalin himself. Since 1938, there has been a dangerously stagnant situation in the political life of the senior leadership of the Soviet regime. Theoretically, the All-Russian Soviet Congress is the highest power institution of the Party, meeting at least once every three years. However, it has been nearly eight years since the last congress convened. During this time, the number of Party members has doubled. A large number of members perished during the war; today, more than half of the members were admitted after the last Party congress. Meanwhile, after the nation has undergone severe upheaval, it is still a small group of original individuals who occupy the highest positions. Indeed, there are certain reasons that have led to fundamental political changes in the governments of every major Western power due to the war, and the causes of this phenomenon also fundamentally exist in the perplexing political life of the Soviet Union, but these causes have not been acknowledged in Russia.
Even in a highly disciplined organization like the Communist Party, the differences in age, viewpoints, and interests between the large number of recently joined members and the small group that has held the highest leadership positions for life will inevitably widen. Most Party members have never seen these top leaders, never spoken to them, and cannot have close political ties with them.
In this situation, who can guarantee that the new and old leadership of the Party (its occurrence is merely a matter of time) can transition smoothly and peacefully, or that competitors will not seek the support of these yet immature and inexperienced masses for their own goals? If such a situation does arise, it would lead to unimaginable consequences, as generally, all Party members have been accustomed to iron discipline and obedience, making them unaccustomed to compromise and reconciliation. If unity is disrupted, rendering the Party paralyzed, Russian society will experience indescribable chaos and weakness. For we know that the Soviet regime is merely a shell containing a group of rabble. There is no local government of this kind in Russia. The current generation of Russians knows nothing of spontaneous collective action. If circumstances arise that disrupt the unity and efficiency of the Party as a political tool, the Soviet Union could very well transform overnight from one of the most powerful countries into one of the weakest and most pitiable.
Therefore, the future of the Soviet regime is far from as secure as the Kremlinists fantasize. They claim they can maintain power. Whether they can calmly and smoothly complete the transition of power from old to new remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the domestic regime's tyranny and the turbulence of international life have severely undermined the great people upon whom this regime relies, causing them to lose hope. It is quite astonishing that today, the ideological power of the Soviet regime has a greater influence outside Russia, beyond the reach of its police forces. This phenomenon evokes a metaphor used by Thomas Mann in his famous novel "Buddenbrooks." Thomas Mann believed that when human organizations have seriously decayed internally, they often appear very strong externally; he compared the Buddenbrooks family at its peak to one of the stars that shone brightest on Earth but had long since ceased to exist. Who dares to deny that the bright light the Kremlin casts on the disillusioned people of the Western world is not, in fact, the fading glow of a constellation that is about to disappear? It cannot be proven that it is so, nor can it be proven that it is not. However, there exists a possibility (which the author believes is quite significant) that the Soviet regime, just like the capitalist world they speak of, contains the seeds of decay, and this seed has already begun to sprout and grow.
IV.
Clearly, the United States cannot expect to maintain close relations with the Soviet regime in the foreseeable future. On the political stage, the Soviet Union should continue to be regarded as a competitor rather than a partner. The Soviet Union cannot sincerely love peace and stability, nor believe that the socialist world and the capitalist world can coexist peacefully and amicably for a long time; rather, it will cautiously and relentlessly exert pressure to weaken and undermine the influence and power of all competitors.
However, although Russia is generally hostile to the West, it is still a relatively weak country, its policies are flexible, and Soviet society contains the seeds of decay. This requires the United States to have confidence in a firm containment policy, using unchangeable counteracting forces at every point where the Russians show signs of infringing upon world peace and stability.
In reality, however, American policy is not purely about maintaining the status quo and waiting for opportunities. American security can influence the development of the internal situation in Russia and even the entire international communist movement through its actions (Russian policies are primarily formulated based on this). This does not merely refer to conducting intelligence activities in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although this is also important. Most importantly, the United States must create the impression among the world's peoples that it has clear goals, can successfully resolve domestic issues, can bear the responsibilities of a world power, and can maintain its beliefs in the face of several major ideological currents currently at play. If this is achieved, the Soviet communist goals will become as hopeless as Don Quixote's dreams, and the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's followers will gradually diminish, adding new difficulties to the Kremlin's foreign policy. Because the myth of capitalism's inevitable decline is the cornerstone of communist philosophy. Even after World War II, the fact that the United States did not experience the decline predicted by the crows of Red Square will have powerful and far-reaching repercussions in the communist world.
Similarly, if the United States shows signs of indecision, discord, and internal division, this will greatly encourage the entire communist movement. If any of the aforementioned tendencies emerge, the communist world will be greatly inspired and elated; Moscow will appear triumphant; Moscow's supporters abroad will increase; and Moscow's influence in international affairs will be significantly strengthened.
To say that the United States alone can decisively influence the fate of the communist movement and quickly bring down the Soviet regime in Russia is an exaggeration. However, the United States can indeed exert tremendous pressure on Soviet policies, forcing the Kremlin to behave more moderately and wisely than in recent years, ultimately leading to the collapse or gradual softening of the Russian regime. Because any mysterious savior movement—especially the Kremlin's savior movement—if it does not adapt itself to the logic of the unfolding situation, will inevitably encounter setbacks.
Thus, the decisive power largely rests with the United States. The U.S.-Soviet relationship is essentially a test of the values of the United States as one of the world's nations. To avoid destruction, the United States only needs to reach its best national traditions and prove itself worthy of survival as a great nation.
Indeed, there is no fairer test of national quality than this. In this case, astute observers of U.S.-Soviet relations have no reason to complain about the Kremlin's challenges to the United States. They should thank God for presenting the American people with this unchangeable challenge, thereby making the safety of the entire American nation dependent on their unity and acceptance of the moral and political leadership responsibilities that history requires of them.